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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j); to wit, appeal 
from a final order of the Eighth District Court, Uintah County, Utah, Judge A. Lynn Payne 
presiding, dated June 3, 2005, and transferred to this Court by order of the Utah Supreme 
Court, dated July 8, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
Since the Plaintiff did not comply with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, in that the Plaintiff's statement of issues does not state the issues of the case, 
Defendant/Appellee submits that the following are the issues of this case: 
I DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO CONTINUE ON THE DAY OF TRIAL, WHERE SAID 
MOTION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WANTED 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO AMEND HIS PLEADING TO INCLUDE A CLAIM 
BASED ON BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY ON THAT ISSUED. 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances. The 
standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1988). 
II DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND HIS PLEADING TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE WHERE 
THE THE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE AMENDMENT. 
Trial courts have limited discretion in determining whether the presentation of the 
merits of the case would be subserved by the amendment and whether the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice the opposing party. Thereafter, the trial court has full discretion 
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Court, dated July 8, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
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the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues 
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This an appeal by the Plaintiff, Hal McKee, to the judgment issued by the Honorable 
A. Lynn Payne in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Uintah County, Utah, dated June 3, 
2005, against the Plaintiff for no cause of action, wherein the Plaintiff sued the Defendant, 
Renn Smith, an adjoining landowner, to remove fencing constructed by the Defendant near 
the boundary between the parties' parcels of land. Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiffs 
statement of the case where it states that "the Court ruled that Appellant (Plaintiff) had 
inadequately plead the doctrine of boundary of acquiescence." The Court simply denied 
Plaintiffs motion to continue which Plaintiff requested so that Plaintiff could amend his 
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pleading and conduct additional discovery on the boundary by acquiescence issue and denied 
Plaintiffs subsequent motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence. Indeed, 
Plaintiff conceded that the Complaint did not include a boundary by acquiescence claim by 
making his motions to continue and to amend. The Court thus was led by the Plaintiffs 
motions to conclude that the Complaint did not contain a claim for boundary by acquiescence. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The first paragraph of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts should be stricken for lack of 
citation to the record. The following should be inserted in its place: 
a. This matter in general involves the boundary line running between 
the Parties' respective plots of land said boundary line also being 
the section and township line (hereinafter, the "Section Line" and/or 
"Boundary Line") running between Section 25, TIN, R1E, Uintah 
Special Meridian ("USM"), and Section 30, TIN, R2E, USM, all 
located in Uintah County, Utah. Specifically, this dispute is over 
the location of a new fence constructed by the Defendant - whether 
it is on the Plaintiffs property or the Defendant's property. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 1, T. at 45). 
b. Plaintiff owns land in Section 25 bordering the Section Line. 
Defendant owns land in Section 30 also bordering the Section Line. 
The Section Line is the Parties' Boundary Line. 
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(Findings of Fact, paragraph 2, T. at 45). 
c. No one disputes the Section Line as it begins in the southwest 
portion of Section 30 and the southeast portion of Section 25. What 
is in dispute is the northeast corner of Section 30 which is also the 
northwest corner of Section 30. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 3, T. at 45). 
d. Local history shows that there was a fence (hereinafter, the "Old 
Fence") that was more or less straight running north/south between 
sections 25 and 30. Everyone believed that the fence was the 
Section Line. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 4, T. at 45). 
e. There were six surveys of the Section Line. The original of Section 
25 and the original of Section 30, both completed in 1875, and 3 or 
4 other surveys. All of these surveys agreed upon the location of 
the Section Line. None of the surveys showed the Section Line 
being where the Old Fence ran. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 5, T. at 45). 
f. There is a Uintah County road, running north/south, roughly 
between the Parties' properties along the Section Line. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 7, T. at 46). 
g. There is a marker located 33 feet east of the Section Line which is 
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consistent with a right of way marker marking the eastern boundary 
of the 66 foot right of way for the County road which runs down the 
center of the Section Line. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 8, T. at 46). 
h. Both the Old Fence and the new fence constructed by the Defendant 
are located on the eastern side of the County Road in Section 30. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 9, T. at 46). 
i. There is no evidence that any portion of the new fence constructed 
by the Defendant is on the Plaintiffs property and there is no 
evidence that the Old Fence was on the Section Line. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 10, T. at 46). 
2. The Uintah County road runs down the Section Line between the parties' 
properties. There are fences on both sides of the road separating the parties' properties from the 
road. The land between the road and the fences are all within Uintah County's 66 foot right of 
way and is thus not only useless for development by either of the parties but development is not 
allowed. 
(Answer, paragraphs 4 and 5, T. at 9-10; Findings of Fact, paragraph 8, T. at 46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Two issues are presented for review. Both issues are related. The first issue is whether 
the Court erred in not granting Plaintiffs motion to continue made on the day of trial because 
Plaintiff wanted to amend his Complaint to include a claim for boundary by acquiescence and 
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wanted to conduct additional discovery related to that claim. The second issue is whether the 
Court erred in not granted the Plaintiffs motion to amend his Complaint to conform to the 
evidence, also made the day of trial after the Court denied the motion to continue. The Court 
thus was led by the Plaintiffs motions to conclude that the Complaint did not contain a claim 
for boundary by acquiescence. Thus, the issue is not whether the Court erred in not treating the 
Complaint as a claim for boundary by acquiescence since the Plaintiff has conceded that the 
Complaint does not contain such a claim. 
As to the Court's ruling on the Motion to Continue, such ruling was purely within the 
Court's discretionary power to make under Rule 40(b) and did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances of this case. 
As to the Court's ruling on the Motion to Amend to Conform to the Evidence, although 
the Findings of Fact did not state that the presentation of the merits of the case would not be 
subserved by the allowance of the motion to amend the complaint or that the Defendant would 
be prejudiced by allowing the motion to amend as required by Rule 40(b), this may be 
considered harmless error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure since such is 
immaterial to the outcome of the case because the fences on both sides of the Uintah County 
road, including both the old fence and the new fence which are at issue in this case, are within 
the road right of way, and because the land on each side of the road between the fences and the 
road, including the land at issue in this case, are only slivers of land, and cannot be used for 
development by either party. Thus, it is clear from the record that the presentation of the merits 
of the case, on a boundary by acquiescence claim, would not have been subserved by the 
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allowance of the motion to amend, but would have only caused a waste of additional time and 
expense to both parties. 
Since boundary by acquiescence was not an issue to determine at trial, the Court merely 
found that the new fence did not encroach upon the Plaintiffs land and thus dismissed the 
Complaint. This finding was proper and supported by the evidence at trial and is not a basis for 
review by the Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE ON THE DAY OF TRIAL, 
WHERE SAID MOTION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WANTED ADDITIONAL TIME TO AMEND HIS PLEADING 
TO INCLUDE A CLAIM BASED ON BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
AND TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY ON THAT ISSUED. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, 
including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, 
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause shown. If the 
motion is made upon the ground of the absence of evidence, such 
motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected 
to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon admits that 
such evidence would be given, and that it may be considered as 
actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, 
the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988). In the case at hand, the Plaintiff made the 
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motion to continue on the day of trial. (T. at 44). At the trial were at least four witnesses 
subpoenaed by the parties. (T. at 22-24, and 31-36) . The case had already been pending for 
nearly a year. The Court had already filed two motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute which 
were later withdrawn. (T. at 38-43). The Plaintiff had plenty of time to move to amend his 
pleading. Under these circumstances, the denial of the motion to continue by the trial court did 
not constitute an abuse of the Court's substantial discretion. 
II THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND HIS PLEADING TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE WHERE 
THE THE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE AMENDMENT. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues 
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
In the case at hand, the Court denied the Plaintiffs motion to amend his pleading to 
conform to the evidence in order to include a claim for boundary by acquiescence. Based on that 
motion, the Plaintiff concedes that the Complaint is insufficient to make such a claim. 
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Indeed, from the plain language of the Complaint, it is clear that the Plaintiff is asking the Court 
to order the Defendant to cease encroaching upon Plaintiffs land. (Complaint, paragraph 7; T. 
at 4). Thus, the issue to be determined at trial was whether the new fence was on the Plaintiffs 
land. The Court correctly determined that the new fence was not on Plaintiffs land. (Findings 
of Fact, paragraph 10; Conclusions of Law, paragraph 2; T. at 46-47). 
In the case of England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah App. 1997), this Court stated: 
The decision to permit amendment under rule 15(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is subject to what we have called 
conditional discretionary review. The trial court's discretion to 
grant amendment of the pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction 
of two preliminary requirements: a finding that the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved by amendment and a 
finding that the admission of such evidence would not prejudice the 
adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 
The trial court has only limited discretion in making these 
preliminary findings, but once these prerequisites are met, the trial 
court has full discretion to allow an amendment of the pleadings; 
that is, it may grant or deny a party's motion for amendment upon 
any reasonable basis, and the court's decision can be reversed only 
if abuse of discretion appears. 
Id., 944 P.2d at 345. (Citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, as stated, the Court did not state in its findings of fact that the 
presentation of the merits of the case would not be subserved by the allowance of the motion to 
amend the complaint or that the Defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the motion to 
amend as required by Rule 40(b). However, this court can either assume that the trial court made 
such a finding or it may consider the trial court's omission a harmless error under Rule 61 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure since such is immaterial to the outcome of the case. 
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In this case, the fences on both sides of the Uintah County road, including both the old 
fence and the new fence which are at issue in this case, are within the road right of way, and 
the land on each side of the road between the fences and the road, including the land at issue in 
this case, are only slivers of land that cannot be used for development by either party. Thus, it 
is clear from the record that the presentation of the merits of the case, on a boundary by 
acquiescence claim, would not have been subserved by the allowance of the motion to amend, 
but would have only caused a waste of additional time and expense to both parties. Indeed, 
neither was there any prejudice to either party in the Court's denial of the motion since the Court 
had all of the evidence regarding the history of the fences, the surveys, and the road, as clearly 
stated in the findings of fact. Finding of Fact, paragraphs 4-11, T. at 45-46. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues in his brief that the Court should have concluded that the 
Complaint sufficiently plead the boundary by acquiescence issue under the liberal rules of notice 
pleading. However, the Court was clearly led by the Plaintiffs motions to conclude that the 
Plaintiff had conceded that the Complaint did not plead that issue. Had Plaintiff not made the 
motion to amend, the Plaintiff could have presented the evidence as if the Complaint plead 
boundary by acquiescence and then ask for a finding of such in closing arguments. This would 
have allowed the Defendant to argue the issue and would have allowed the Court to mle on this 
issue. However, this did not happen. There was no argument in the trial court that the 
Complaint plead the boundary by acquiescence issue and thus the issue was not preserved for 
appeal 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court property denied the motion to continue since there was no abuse of 
discretion. The trial court also properly denied the motion to amend, even though the 
appropriate language of Rule 15(b) was not used in the findings of fact, since, under the facts 
of this case, a trial on the issue of boundary by acquiescence would have like led to the same 
result, based on the fact that the property in question is within the road right of way, is only 
a sliver of land, and cannot be put to use by the Plaintiff. The issue of whether the Complaint 
included a claim for boundary by acquiescence was not argued in the trial court, was not ruled 
on by the trial court, and was thus not preserved for appeal. 
Wherefore, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to deny Plaintiffs request to 
overturn the trial court's Final Order, dated June 3, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted this ay of February, 2005. 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
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TRIAL COURT'S FINAL ORDER 
c.4 
{• {3 
DANIEL S. SAM, #5865 
DANIEL S. SAM, PC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (435) 789-1301 
IN TI IE E1G)ITII JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAII COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAL MCKEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RENN SMITH, 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER 
Case No. 030800509 
Judge: A. Lynn Payne 
This matter cainc before the Court on July 7, 2004, for a bench trial. Plaintiff, I lal M '<ce, 
was present and represented by counsel, Cindy Barton-Coombs. Defendant, Renn Smith, was pi sent 
and represented by counsel, Daniel S. Sam. At the outset, the Plaintiirmadc a motion to contiii' e the 
trial in order to investigate the issue concerning the location of the section line. Plaintiff also nadc 
a motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence under Section 15, U R C P The 
Defendant objected to both motions. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Condi. ,ions 
of Law herein, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs motion to continue is denied for lack of a showing of good cause, and 
PlaintifFs motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence is denied for a lack of showing 
of consent of the Defendant. 
2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the basis of no cause of action since 
Defendants new fence does not encroach upon PlaintifFs property and there is no need for the Court 
to quiet title. 
3. Each party is ordered to pay their own costs and attorney fees in this matter. 
DATED this day of May, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
A. LYNN PAYNE 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CINDY BARTON-COOMBS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FD SnuUi.fof.wpd 
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1. Plaintiff's motion to continue is denied for lack of a showing of good cause, and 
Plaintiffs motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence is denied for a lack of showing 
of consent of the Defendant, 
2. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the basis of no cause of action since 
Defendants new fence docs not encroach upon Plaintiffs property and f here is no need foir the Court 
to quiet title. 
3 Each party is ordered to pay their own costs and attorney fees in this matter. 
DATED this ^/l^day of May, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
Conformed som. 
A. LYNN PAYNE 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CINDY BARTON-COOMBS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PD SmUk,(of.wp4 
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DANIEL S. SAM, #5865 
DANIEL S. SAM, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (435) 789-1301 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF U1NTAII COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAL MCKEE, 
vs. 
1U2NN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. ' 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Case No. 030800509 
1 Judge: A. Lynn Payne 
This matter came before the Court on July 7, 2004, for a bench trial. Plaintiff, Hal McKcc, 
was present and represented by counsel, Cindy Barton-Coombs. Defendant, Renn Smith, was present 
and represented by counsel, Daniel S. Sam. At the outset, the PlaintifFmade a motion to continue the 
trial in order to investigate the issue concerning the location of the section line. Plaintiff also made 
a motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence under Section 15, U.R.C.P. The 
Defendant objected to both motions. The Court, after having heard testimony from the parties, 
having received and reviewed the trial exhibits, and hearing the arguments and representations of 
counsel for the respective parlies, having reviewed the pleadings and olhcr papers on file, and being 
fully advised in the premises, does now make and enter the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. 1 boundary line running between the Parties 
respective plots of land, said boundary line also being the section and tovvnship line (hereinaflci, the 
"Section. ,.«^  .. . : . lioundar) I inc"" )i tinning between Seethe \ T ] N P M; I rSM, and Section 
J~, 'I IN, R2E, USM, all located in Uintah County, Utah. Specifically, this dispute is ovei the 
location of a new fence constructed by the Defendant - whetlier it is on the Plaintiffs property 01 the 
Defendan 
Plaintiff owns land in Section 25 bordering the Section • . ' • r i *• s 
1
 1 1 1 5 > - ..! 
3. No one disputes the Section Line as it begins in the southwest portion of S m i ^ r •'•) 
and the s> : int..in :ast poi lie n • ::if J> z stion 25. i ;\ hat is in dispi ite is the northeast corner cu ;>uiir! . 
which is also the nor thwest corner of Section 30. 
4. I .ocal history shows that there was a fence (hereinafter the "Old Fence") that was 
more or less straight running north/south between sections 25 and "c TIC • belie ^  ec I Liu .1 tin : 
fence was the Section I inc. 
5. ! I lien: e w ei e six si nit Z) rsof t h c S e zU :: .nil in :::„ 1 'lit ::::(: it iginal c i: Scctic -n 25 an ill h< :: : J iginal 
of Section 30, I n )l,l;i completed in 1875, and 3 or 4 other si irvcys. All of these si n vcys agreed i ip ,;n 
Fence ran. 
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6. Any disagreement between surveys dealt with the length of the Section Line. Such 
disagreements as to the length of the Section Line did not change the location of the Section Line. 
7. There is a Uintah County road, running north/south, roughly between the Parties' 
properties alone the Section Line. 
& There is a marker located 33 feet east of the Section Line which is consistent with a 
right of way marker marking the eastern boundary of the 66 foot right of way for the County road 
which runs down the center of the Section Line. 
9. Both the old fence and the new fence constructed by the Defendant are located on I < ic 
eastern side of the County Road in Section 30. 
10. There is no evidence that any poi tion of the new fence constructed by the Defend it 
is on the Plaintiffs property and there is no evidence that the old fence was on the Section Line 
11. There is no evidence showing that the Plaintiff brought this action in bad faith since 
all of the old timers thought the old fence was the Section Line. 
12. Good cause does not exist to support the granting of Plaintiffs motion to continue. 
13. Plaintiff s motion to amend his pleading would have raised a new issue which was not 
consented to by the Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs motion to continue should be denied for lack of a showing of good cause, 
and Plaintiffs motion to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence should be denied for a lack 
uf showing of consent of the Defendant. 
3 
2 Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice on the basis of no cause of 
for the Coin t to quiet title. 
in M I In | in in mi i"! .In i in In I b e Q I tl c i m l inn \\i\y i l i e i i o w n c o s is a m i . u i u i iiu-y U c\s in i ln ^ in . l i t e r . 
DATED this «2Q$»day ofMajf2005. 
BYTH ECOl JRT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CINDY BARTON-COOMBS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
A. LYNN9ffftffl«I c°Py 
District Cot irt Judge 
M-kA. 
• Jftrf^-^r^ 
FD SfiiilltJi: I , ' 'J' J 
Ob U i : 4 7 p C i n a y l i a r t o r i Loombs U l t o r HJb /dd: u n u 
2. Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed with prejudice on the basia of no cause of 
action since Defendants new fence docs not encroach upon PlaintilTs property and tlcrc is no need 
for the Court to quiet title 
3 Each party should be ordered to pay their own costs and attorney fees in this w attcr. 
DATED this day of May, 2005 
BY THE COURT 
A. LYNN PAYNE 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
CINDY I^ AJRTON COOMBS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FDSfttkhfofwpd 
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